CS Paper Radar

Weekly top 20 · Security & Privacy

2026-W47 Nov 16 – Nov 22, 2026

Ranked from 1,465 papers submitted on 2 days — week in progress, ranks can still change.

Score = weighted mean ofCitations 20%Upvotes 10%Code stars 10%Venue 15%Code/data 10%Novelty 15%Momentum 15%Substance 5%how it works
1

From Attack Tree to Model Checker: Binding CAPEC Patterns to Verify Robotic System Security

cs.CR cs.LO ·2026-11-17 ·Juel Hussain, Louise A. Dennis, Clare Dixon, Marie Farrell
published
Abstract · In Proceedings FMAS 2026, arXiv:2611.21375

Security-minded verification of autonomous and robotic systems presupposes an attacker, yet the path from a threat catalogue to a checkable attacker model is still traversed by hand. This research preview presents the theory and construction of a pipeline that mechanises it. Each leaf of an attack tree is mapped to a CAPEC attack pattern and written in first-order logic as a rule: the attacker's prerequisites imply the attack's effect. Casting the pattern as such a rule is what makes it operational - its variables can be bound to a specific system's parts, and its prerequisites can then be tested against that system under a chosen configuration of security controls. Binding is our means of verifying whether a system is vulnerable to a given attack: from a bound pattern we derive an attacker model, turn its effect into a temporal-logic property, and check that property against the system with and without a countermeasure, reporting the control that defeats the attack. We describe the signature, schemas, profiles for approach, and explore how CAPEC can support reasoning about robotics security.

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2

Is 4-Bit Quantization More Than Noise to a Chat Model's Safety Behaviour? Attributing Behavioural Shifts with Matched Perturbations

cs.CR cs.CL ·2026-11-17 ·Ege Kaya
code/data
Abstract · 16 pages, 4 figures. Code and labels: https://github.com/egekaya1/qrefusal

Chat models on phones and laptops are usually 4-bit copies of the model that was evaluated, and audits of such copies disagree about what quantization does to refusal. A 4-bit build is one of many weight perturbations of the same size, so a change in its behaviour could come from its specific rounding error or from any perturbation that large. In a pre-registered study of three 3-4B chat models, with paired tests, blind human labels and an 8-bit null, we find two 4-bit shifts of opposite sign: with a compliant reply prefilled, Qwen2.5-3B continues into harmful content more often, and on held-out jailbreaks Llama-3.2-3B complies 10.3 points less often. Matched perturbations separate the two. Shuffled and Gaussian versions of the error average close to zero, while scaling the real error, from its mirror image to twice its size, changes behaviour near-linearly. At half the real error, Llama's likelihood is almost unchanged, yet it already complies 5.8 points less often, and llama.cpp's Q4_K_M, at the same bits per weight, moves neither model. Refusal under 4-bit quantization depends on the specific rounding error, not on bits per weight or likelihood, so each build has to be compared with its original.

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3

Network-Exposed Configuration Attacks on LLM-Controlled Social Robots

cs.CR cs.AIcs.RO ·2026-11-17 ·Stanley Akingbola, Ugbede Ibrahim, Yan Lin Aung, Quang Dan Le, Hong Qing Yu
code/data
Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) in embodied robots create security dependencies beyond inference. We investigate a network-exposed configuration attack on the Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini Lite, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to replace personality settings and the cloud LLM's system prompt through a management interface, without adversarial conversational input. Eleven prompt-injection attempts across five categories were reported as resisted, whereas both configuration-layer attack paths produced observable behavioural changes on physical hardware. We demonstrate local and network-adjacent access, mapping the weakness to CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for a Critical Function) and CWE-1327 (Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address), with a reported CVSS v3.1 score of 6.5 (Medium). A configuration endpoint also accepts cross-origin requests without a CORS preflight (CWE-352; 6.5 Medium), while the persistent-memory sink stores content without enforcing its stated restrictions. A source review of 59 public repositories identifies missing authentication in 10 of 11 source-verifiable genuine applications, or 11 of 11 including a framework-default case. These findings indicate recurrence within the sampled repositories, not prevalence in commercial products. We characterise a deployment gap between developer-oriented network assumptions and consumer-facing embodied AI security: inference-layer refusal cannot prevent unauthorised changes to model instructions. Potential consequences include surveillance through onboard cameras and microphones and social engineering of nearby users. Proof-of-concept code, evidence and the survey are available at https://bit.ly/reachypi.

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4

Can Verifiable PIR Match the Online Efficiency of SimplePIR?

cs.CR ·2026-11-17 ·Xinxuan Zhang, Ruida Wang, Zirui Wang, Yuming Guo, Jikang Bai +3 more
top venue
Abstract · Accepted for publication at the 2027 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (IEEE S&P 2027)

Verifiable Private Information Retrieval (vPIR) ensures that a malicious server cannot return tampered database records, but it traditionally incurs significant overhead compared to classical PIR.Recent advancements, notably VeriSimplePIR, approach the online efficiency of SimplePIR by introducing a proof preprocessing phase and requiring only lightweight client-side online verification. However, this scheme relies on an additional Short Integer Solution (SIS) assumption and SIS-based commitments, which only support relaxed range proofs. Consequently, these schemes are forced to adopt significantly weaker parameter choices, resulting in additional online overhead. In this paper, we propose a novel vPIR protocol that employs a newly designed error-correcting code-based commitment scheme as the database digest. This approach (i)supports efficient proofs of linear relations, (ii) achieves precise range proofs and (iii) eliminates the reliance on the SIS assumption. Thus, our scheme successfully adopts parameter choices identical to those of SimplePIR. As a result, our vPIR protocol is the first to achieve exactly the same online communication and server computation costs as SimplePIR, while keeping online client computation nearly identical. Additionally, compared to VeriSimplePIR,our protocol reduces online communication and client-side computation by approximately 20%, and decreases online server-side computation by over 35%.

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5

Exposure and remediation in the French maritime sector: a passive measurement of 129 organisations

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Edouard Vallet, Colomban Monnier
unusual
Abstract · 5 pages, 5 tables. Also deposited on Zenodo, doi:10.5281/zenodo.24279346

Maritime transport and ports are essential entities under the EU NIS2 directive, but there is little public data on the external exposure of the sector in France. In March 2026, after physical attacks on Western interests in the Middle East raised the risk of cyber retaliation against French maritime operators, we assessed the internet-facing attack surface of 129 organisations: 103 French companies and 26 international operators active in French waters. The March assessment was passive. It used DNS and email-authentication records, TLS certificates, search-engine indexing, archived pages, public JavaScript, cloud storage naming and third-party internet-scan data (Shodan), with no connection attempt beyond ordinary public web requests. After manual verification we retained 475 findings, 3.7 per organisation. 46% of organisations had at least one high or critical finding and 11% at least one critical finding, including exposed databases, unpatched services with known CVEs, an exposed credentials file, publicly listed cloud buckets and a subdomain open to takeover. The most common gap was email spoofing protection, with no enforced DMARC policy at 60% of organisations. French companies fared worse than international operators (49% vs 35% at high or critical risk; 4.0 vs 2.3 findings per organisation). Between 2 and 18 March 2026, individual reports were sent for 43 of the audited domains. We rescanned 123 organisations in November 2026. Among March critical and high findings that could be rechecked, 52% were gone for organisations that had received a report and 54% for those that had not, so private email disclosure had no measurable effect on remediation. Results are aggregated and anonymised.

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6

Post-Quantum Migration of Wi-Fi Key Establishment: A Hybrid ML-KEM Design for OWE and FILS, Validated on OWE with hostapd

cs.CR cs.NI ·2026-11-16 ·Jesús R. Abascal, Ana I. Gómez, Domingo Gómez-Pérez
Abstract · 8 pages, 4 figures, 4 tables

The key agreements that protect a Wi-Fi connection rely on Diffie-Hellman, which a sufficiently capable quantum computer would break; an adversary can therefore record an association today and decrypt its traffic years later. Key establishment is thus the part of IEEE 802.11 that has to be migrated first. This work targets the two protocols that perform that agreement inside the frames used to set up the link: Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE), which encrypts otherwise open networks, and Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS), designed for fast connection in dense and mobile deployments. We propose replacing their Diffie-Hellman exchange with a hybrid one that runs the classical elliptic-curve agreement alongside ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and derives the master key from both secrets, so the connection stays protected as long as either component remains unbroken. The exchange reuses the frames each protocol already sends and adds no extra round trip; an access point can advertise the hybrid mode alongside classical OWE, and a station configured to require it refuses to associate without a completed post-quantum exchange. Binding the advertised capabilities to the derived key is specified as a design extension and is not part of the prototype. We validate the design with a working implementation on hostapd and wpa_supplicant: both endpoints derive the same key in every measured connection, with the two smaller parameter sets each enlarged association frame fits in a single frame even under a conservative 1500-byte fragmentation threshold, and the added connection time and computation stay below half a millisecond. The measurements are obtained on OWE; the design carries over to FILS, whose frame budget is left for specific measurement. Of the three ML-KEM parameter sets, the intermediate one offers the best balance between security level and size.

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7

The CYBER-BRIDGE project: An AI-Powered Platform for Cross-Border Cybersecurity, Compliance and Forensics in the EU

cs.CR cs.AIcs.CY ·2026-11-16 ·Nikolaos Kekatos, Georgios Koutidis, Charalampos Bratsas, Stefan Bucur, Alexandra-Mihaela Chirlejan +10 more
published
Abstract · 7 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables. Accepted at the 2026 IEEE International Confer Resilience (IEEE CSR 2026)

Cross-border cyber attacks on European SMEs and critical-infrastructure operators expose a structural cyber-resilience gap: cybersecurity (threat sharing, detection, response), compliance (framework assessment, certification) and digital forensics (cross-jurisdictional evidence) are jointly regulated by NIS2, the CRA, GDPR and the LED, yet their tooling evolved in silos and rarely interoperates across Member States. The EU-funded CYBER-BRIDGE project integrates the three domains under one architecture and a hash-chained evidence layer: AI-driven CTI sharing with ENISA-aligned notification, multi-framework assessments with retrieval-augmented advisory, and RFC 3161-anchored custody with lawful GDPR/LED exchange, all aligned with MITRE ATT&CK. A sanitised replica of the back-end image hosts a Cyber-Range for upskilling. The contribution is not the individual tools but the reconciliation mechanism that lets one incident produce, from a single evidence record, a cross-border CTI advisory, the regulatory notifications its deadlines demand and a re-verifiable forensic pack; we set out why binding three differently regulated evidence regimes onto one record is non-trivial and how the shared evidence layer resolves the resulting tensions. This paper introduces the project's scope, requirements, pilots, architecture and toolkits; quantitative KPIs follow in later deliverables.

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8

Beyond Semantic Prompts: Unified Watermarking and Access Control for Text-to-Image Diffusion Models

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Fangming Shi, Li Li, Guorui Feng, Xinpeng Zhang
code/data
Abstract · 13 pages, 10 figures, 5 tables

Text-to-image diffusion services require both traceability of generated content and differentiated access to generation capabilities. However, existing watermarking methods commonly expose watermark control through mechanisms beyond the text-prompt interface, while credential-based access control does not inherently enforce distinct output quality levels. We propose a unified framework that enables customizable multi-bit watermark embedding and tiered access control through a single text prompt. A unified prompt represents watermark messages using designated words and associates protocol structures with different access states. The framework adopts a two-stage training strategy. First, watermark payload partitioning represents messages as designated watermark words, while vocabulary extension assigns each protocol word a dedicated token with a learnable input embedding. Guided by a frozen reference model and a pretrained watermark codec, joint adaptation of the U-Net and protocol-token embeddings transfers message-dependent watermark patterns into the generation process. Second, a prompt-structure recognition network controls feature modulation within the variational autoencoder decoder, which is trained to produce clear watermarked images, blurred previews, or black outputs according to the access state. Experiments demonstrate reliable watermark recovery, robustness to common image-processing operations and evaluated model modifications, and consistent performance across diverse generation settings. The controlled decoder also achieves distinct output behaviors under restricted access while closely preserving reference decoding fidelity and watermark recoverability under full access. Our open-source code and model weights will be public after acceptance.

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9

MASTA: A Feedback-Scheduled Multi-Agent System for End-to-End Tamarin Modeling and Analysis

cs.CR cs.AI ·2026-11-16 ·Yongkang Xiao, Qiyi Deng, Jing Chen, Min Shi, Ju Ma +1 more
publishedbenchmark
Abstract · Accepted at NeurIPS 2026 (Main Track, poster). 19 pages

Tamarin-based formal verification of security protocols requires expert-authored multiset rewriting rules and temporal-logic lemmas. Translating a natural-language protocol description into a complete formal model with an LLM is hard because syntactic, reachability, and property-level errors compound across the multi-step modeling process, and a single agent that both authors and self-evaluates cannot reliably localize them. We present MASTA, a multi-agent system that addresses these difficulties through three innovations. First, an operational--evaluative role decomposition assigns rule modeling to an Architect, property modeling to an Auditor, and pure dispatch to a dedicated Arbiter that holds no authoring duties. Second, the Arbiter implements a Tamarin-anchored scheduler that dispatches the next agent based on the latest verifier verdict and routes problem-tagged fixes through a modification list, with a six-class problem taxonomy and an LLM deduplication check preventing routing deadlock. Third, we construct a benchmark of 10 protocols paired with 139 mutation variants and five fine-grained metrics that jointly assess model correctness ($M_1$--$M_3$) and completeness ($M_4$--$M_5$). On this benchmark, MASTA on Qwen 3.5-plus improves over OpenCode on the same backbone by up to $+0.27$ on individual metrics and ranks first on both the correctness and completeness averages, surpassing Codex (GPT-5.5) and Claude Code (Opus 4.7) despite using a weaker LLM. Ablations on five protocols confirm that removing the Arbiter collapses property and verification scores to zero.

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10

Watermark Evidence under Open-Weight LLM Modification: Exact Bounds for Low-Rank Output Watermarks

cs.CR cs.AIcs.CL ·2026-11-16 ·Prashant Shekhar, Dumindu Samaraweera, Caroline Howard
theorycode/data
Abstract

Open-weight language models can continue generating after their released weights are modified, while a watermark verifier still scores outputs against the original base and marked models. We study how such modifications change the evidence available to an OpenStamp-style verifier. At each shared prefix, we represent the modification as a residual in the next-token logits. We derive an exact finite-vocabulary lower bound on the expected log-likelihood-ratio evidence under a residual-span constraint, along with a sharp span-only deviation bound. We also characterize the first-order evidence shift through a covariance term with an explicit second-order remainder, and determine the residual span needed to reach a target evidence level. For sequence-level detection, we derive an exact conditional exponential-moment bound and combine it with a supermartingale argument and a distribution-free order-statistic tolerance bound. This yields a high-confidence upper bound on miss probability after attack selection on calibration data and evaluation on independent certification continuations. In experiments with OpenStamp on Llama-2-7B and Mistral-7B-v0.3, INT8 quantization and 30% pruning retain test true-positive rates of 85.6-94.8%, while 500-step LoRA fine-tuning lowers them to 28.8% and 11.6%. The covariance prediction tracks the measured mean LoRA evidence drift on both models, with no remainder-bound violations across 160,000 test prefixes. Additionally, we observe zero false positives among 500 base-model continuations per model. Through these theoretical and empirical results, the current research provides a better understanding of watermark robustness to model-editing/tuning attacks.

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11

KVMARK: Fragile Watermarking for KV-Cache Integrity in Latent Multi-Agent Systems

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Marjan Beheshti, Ronghua Xu
Abstract

Latent multi-agent communication directly transfers Key-Value (KV) cache tensors between transformer-based agents, bypassing text serialization entirely. While computationally efficient and reasoning accurate, this communication channel is opaque and vulnerable to man-in-the-middle tampering, a threat vector unaddressed by existing text-based or behavioral watermarks, which cannot operate on continuous internal representations. To address this vulnerability, we propose KVMark, a training-free, zero-bit KV-cache watermarking framework to verify inter-agent handoff integrity. Our framework introduces four core technical components: (1) position-dependent sign patterns that guarantee first-order statistical invisibility while preserving downstream attention survival; (2) per-head sign patterns with aligned detection to defeat head-averaging attacks; (3) a three-tier depth-aware strength schedule that equalizes detection sensitivity across transformer layers while maintaining invisibility against nine statistical profiling strategies; and (4) content-bound key derivation that cryptographically binds watermarks to input contexts, preventing replay attacks under Kerckhoffs's principle. Empirical evaluation on a four-agent latent pipeline demonstrates $100\%$ detection across $1{,}500$ handoffs with a $0.0\%$ false positive rate ($\text{AUROC}=1.0$), $100\%$ layer-level tamper localization ($17/17$ attacked layers identified with $0/19$ false positives), and no statistically significant reasoning accuracy degradation across four benchmarks ($N{=}300$--$500$). Furthermore, the framework enables multi-hop cascade verification to isolate compromised agents (500/500 detection at three hops), withstands adaptive white-box adversaries and the Out-of-Sight DiffMean attack (up to $α=8.0$), and generalizes seamlessly to Qwen3-8B without re-tuning (1,500/1,500 TPR).

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12

Experience: ENTRAP - An IaC Enterprise Cyber Range for Reproducible Security Assessment and Dataset Generation

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Rathan Appana, Aditya Kulkarni, Bheemarjuna Reddy Tamma
Abstract

An enterprise breach causes most of its damage after the perimeter is crossed. Once an attacker gains a foothold, they can move laterally to other hosts, take over the trusted services of the network, and encrypt the backups needed for recovery. Defenders, on the other hand, need to study this post-compromise stage, but they cannot rehearse it on a production enterprise network. Building such an enterprise network manually is time-consuming, and resetting it to its clean state between runs is still harder. As a result, security experiments are difficult to perform, compare and reproduce. We develop Enterprise Network Testbed for Reproducible Attack and Defense Practices (ENTRAP), an Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) cyber range that defines a fully segmented enterprise as version-controlled automation. ENTRAP uses Ansible, KVM/Libvirt, and Cloud-init to provision the environment and reset it to a clean state whenever necessary. The enterprise network includes several entities such as a gateway, an internal Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), DNS, DHCP, a backup server, a web server, and clients. On this network, a user can learn to assemble the entities, launch attacks, and write rules or defensive measures that harden its security. We launch three attacks: a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)-backed ransomware campaign, a Layer-2 DHCP starvation and rogue DHCP attack, and perimeter web exploitation. Each attack runs from a clean state, and ENTRAP acts as a reproducible generator of labeled attack datasets. Using the collected dataset, we train a Random Forest classifier for ransomware detection and present its evaluation results. We publicly release the codebase, collected logs, and datasets to facilitate further research.

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13

The Provenance-Privacy Paradox: Can Private Cloud Compute (PCC) Prove That Apple Reference Images Are Not Used for Learning?

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Mohammad I. Husain, Viet Nguyen
position
Abstract

Apple Reference Image (ARI) combines camera-sensor signatures, Secure Enclave attestation (SEP), cryptographic timestamp bounds, Private Cloud Compute (PCC), and a final post-quantum signature to establish photographic provenance. PCC is central to this process because it validates the secure digital negative and develops authenticated raw sensor measurements into a reference JPEG. Although the secure digital negative is encrypted during transmission, the authorized PCC workload must process the raw pixels in plaintext. This requirement creates a provenance-privacy paradox: cloud processing strengthens the provenance guarantee while giving an Apple-authorized, machine-learning-capable workload access to valuable, hardware-authenticated raw imagery. We argue that workload attestation and transparency-log inclusion verify software identity and authorization but do not, by themselves, prove that an authorized workload cannot learn from or retain information derived from the photograph. We implement this counterexample in a Python- and Docker-based experimental testbed that models relevant ARI and PCC functions. Across 27 public-domain photographs, a baseline workload and a learning-enabled workload both passed the same verification checks and returned byte-for-byte identical JPEGs. However, the learning-enabled workload retained a first-layer gradient of approximately 48 KB from which its 64 x 64 input was reconstructed with a maximum absolute per-pixel error of 6 x 10^-8. The additional processing overhead was small relative to image decoding and processing. These results do not demonstrate that Apple currently trains on ARI photographs or reproduce production PCC, but identify non-learning and non-retention as independently verifiable assurance requirements.

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14

Scenario-Based Risk Certificates for Multi-Property Vulnerability Discovery in Parametric MDPs

cs.CR cs.AI ·2026-11-16 ·Zhiming Chi, Andrea Turrini, Yong Li, Lijun Zhang
theory
Abstract · VMCAI 2027

Safety-critical systems such as network protocols and distributed algorithms depend on environmental parameters whose exact values are uncertain. Parametric Markov decision processes (pMDPs) model such systems by making transition probabilities symbolic functions of the parameters. For a single quantitative requirement, parametric verification asks which parameter valuations satisfy the requirement. In practice, however, engineers often monitor several safety and performance requirements at once, and one valuation may make several requirements vulnerable simultaneously. In this paper we study multi-property vulnerability discovery under requirement-wise semantics: given a pMDP and M quantitative requirements, we construct candidate regions of the parameter space that may contain violations, and study budgets for random testing under a specified parameter distribution. To solve this, we adopt a two-layered approach in which the scenario-approximation layer provides PAC guarantees on identifying conservative vulnerability regions for each requirement while the testing layer treats random parameter exploration as coverage of overlapping regions and yields a stopping certificate computed from the marginal region masses alone; a composition theorem then bounds the expected non-discovery score by the scenario approximation error plus the testing risk from the two layers. For confirmed discoveries, candidate hits are checked by model checking and budgets use independently certified discovery probabilities. Experiment evaluate these certificates using empirical surrogates and independent confidence bounds.

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15

A Forensic Analysis of Metadata and Information Leakage in Swedish Public Documents

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Noor Abo Hasan, Kajsa Linderoth, Monia Lönn
Abstract · 10 pages, 3 figures

This study investigates metadata and structural content leakage in publicly available PDF documents from 30 Swedish public-sector authorities. Using an automated collection pipeline and ExifTool-based extraction, 2,876 documents were analyzed and classified using an R0-R3 risk taxonomy. Results reveal that 48.4% of documents exhibit significant metadata exposure (R2 or R3), with significant variation across institutional tiers (p < 0.001). Longitudinal analysis across three legislative periods reveals a statistically significant reduction in metadata exposure between the baseline and post-enactment periods, yet 44.9% of documents published after the enactment of the Swedish Cybersäkerhetslagen continue to leak sensitive metadata. Furthermore, 41.6% of documents contain incremental update layers; forensic analysis recovered verifiable text alterations, including deleted personal data and internal identifiers, from 228 of these cases. These findings highlight persistent regulatory lag and a systemic reliance on default, unsanitized document publication workflows within the Swedish public sector.

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16

Optimal Dynamic Fees for L2s: A Vault Approach

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Ulysse Pavloff, Lin Oshitani
benchmark
Abstract · 24 pages, 3 figures, 3 tables

Layer 2 (L2) blockchains incur costs when posting data to Layer 1 (L1) and charge users fees intended to recover those costs. We model this mechanism as a *vault*: user fees increase its balance, L1 posting costs reduce it, and surplus and deficit accumulate over time. Forecast-based fees aim to recover posting costs, but forecast errors accumulate in the vault. Returning the vault balance to a target requires feedback on the accumulated error. Treating the vault as a discrete-time control system, we derive in closed form the optimal trade-off between vault tracking and fee smoothness in an idealized benchmark. The optimal rule retains a fraction of the previous fee and corrects in proportion to the current vault error. This fee-memory fraction is the single parameter tracing the entire trade-off frontier. We compare proportional (P), proportional-integral (PI), and Arbitrum-style controllers against this frontier, both analytically and on historical Ethereum fee data. At the fee movement implied by Arbitrum's current parameters, the optimal rule reduces the benchmark tracking error by about one third. Fee memory improves the tracking-smoothness trade-off.

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17

Verifiable Random Sampling of Private Data Without a Trusted Single Party

cs.CR cs.AI ·2026-11-16 ·Muhammed Karamuk, Mikołaj Glinka, Ruben Wolff
Abstract · 12 pages

Problem: When a party supports claims about a private dataset by disclosing a sample, auditors cannot tell whether it was drawn at random or "cherry-picked" to hide flaws in the rest of the data. Solution: The data holder commits to the hashes of every item in its dataset and registers the commitment with independent servers. Selection then waits on a decentralized randomness beacon: a network that jointly emits a fresh random value every few seconds, outside the control of the data holder and the auditors. The value emitted two beacon rounds after the commitment picks the sample. Each server returns a signed receipt, so anyone can later check that the revealed sample is exactly the one that value prescribes. Selection from the committed set stays unbiased as long as the beacon's threshold holds and one required server is honest, and a pre-agreed name, checked with the servers, stops repeated or abandoned draws. We call this protocol NoCherry. Applications: Any audit that spot-checks a private corpus: private AI benchmarks and held-out test sets, dataset quality claims, code and security audits, test-fairness review, vulnerability handling, and compliance sampling. Auditors need not trust the data holder to hand over a representative sample of the committed data, since the protocol proves it, and data holders need not expose their entire dataset.

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18

How Well Is My Artwork Protected? Predicting and Tailoring Protection against Style Mimicry by Personalization

cs.CR ·2026-11-17 ·Jihye Kang, Jiwon Park, Sungwoo Hwang, Namhyuk Ahn
unusual
Abstract

Protection tools add an imperceptible perturbation to each artwork so that a model personalized on it fails to imitate its style, and they apply one recipe, a protection method at a fixed strength, to every artwork. We find that the same recipe protects artworks very differently, well beyond the noise of personalization seeds, and that cheap signals predict this protection before any personalization. Because protection rises and falls together across recipes, our method, Patina, predicts the protection of every recipe from one short trial protection and gives each artwork the weakest recipe whose predicted protection reaches a chosen level. At the same level of visibility, Patina lets more artworks pass the protection threshold than any single recipe and warns the artist about artworks for which no recipe is predicted to pass it.

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19

Baryonic Keys and the Inheritance of Crypto-Assets: Revisiting the Tales From the Crypt Protocol

cs.CR ·2026-11-16 ·Frédéric Prost
Abstract · 24 Pages

The inheritance of crypto-assets faces a structural obstacle: ownership is the knowledge of a key, so the key either disappears with its owner or has to be shared beforehand. The Tales From the Crypt Protocol (TFCP) addressed one part of the problem, the distributed and privacy-preserving acknowledgment of a death by a blockchain. We revisit it with a new primitive. A \emph{baryonic key} is a physical object from which bits are obtained only through a measurement, are never stored digitally, and which exists in exactly $n$ copies, where $n$ is neither zero nor unbounded. We define the primitive, outline a candidate instantiation based on a replicated micro-fractured relief, and state its limits: digitising a copy is slow and tamper-evident, not impossible. We also outline other uses of the primitive, from post-quantum pre-shared keys to common coins for Byzantine agreement. We then give a threat model for TFCP, review the attack models of the literature that apply to it, and show where it resists and where it does not. We propose TFCP-B, in which decrypting the will requires both a secret shared among registrars and the response of a baryonic key, and in which heirs claim their share through hash commitments, without any prior key or wallet. We detail each change from TFCP to TFCP-B, with its rationale and its price. TFCP-B removes the anonymity loss caused by colluding registrars and blocks several false-alarm attacks. It does not remove the shallow-account attack, remains exposed to transaction censorship during the deliberation period, and introduces new assumptions on custodians and reading devices. The security arguments are informal and the physical figures are design estimates.

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20

The Cybersecurity Dataset Observatory: Which Data for AI in Cybersecurity?

cs.CR cs.AI ·2026-11-16 ·Francesco Cerasuolo, Gabriele Mangiacapre, Antonio Pescapè
benchmarkdatasetcode/data
Abstract

AI is increasingly used for cybersecurity tasks such as intrusion and malware detection, in enterprise, industrial, vehicular and mobile networks. Its effectiveness depends on data: models need representative network traffic, both to be trained and to be evaluated realistically. Public datasets of cybersecurity network traffic, however, are scattered across laboratory pages, repositories and aggregators, and are continuously released, corrected and withdrawn: 92 of the 234 datasets we catalog were released in 2023 or later. At this pace, surveys that list them are outdated soon after publication, since they describe the field only as it was when they were written. We present the Cybersecurity dataset observatory, a public and continuously updated catalog of cybersecurity datasets based on network traffic. New datasets are added as they are found or submitted, every record is periodically re-checked against its original source, to which it links rather than hosting the data, and every change is recorded in a public change log. This paper documents the first release: we define a traffic-centered scope and a seven-axis taxonomy, and review 234 datasets (204 original captures and 30 derivatives) across 14 domains. The review shows a field that grows quickly but unevenly, where 91 datasets distribute only processed records, a few laboratories produce a large share of the data, and UAV, wireless and V2X networks have little public evidence, while 5G has few real captures. We then relate the catalog to common uses in AI research, outline a procedure for selecting datasets, and discuss benchmark pitfalls and open gaps.

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